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Editor’s Note: If all goes as planned, the American Psychiatric Association will release a 
new Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) in May 2013. Since 
1980, the DSM has provided a shared diagnostic language to clinicians, patients, 
scientists, school systems, courts, and pharmaceutical and insurance companies; any 
changes to the influential manual will have serious ramifications. But, argues Dr. Steven 
Hyman, the DSM is a poor mirror of clinical and biological realities; a fundamentally 
new approach to diagnostic classification is needed as researchers uncover novel ways to 
study and understand mental illness. 
 
Article available online at http://dana.org/news/cerebrum/detail.aspx?id=32066 
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Author’s disclaimer: I have written this piece to argue my individual views. These 
do not represent official views of the DSM-5 Task Force, of which I am a member, 
or of the International Advisory Group working on the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD-11) chapter on Mental and Behavioral Disorders, which I chair. 
 
Writing in Cerebrum (October 2009), distinguished psychiatrist Paul McHugh 
noted that the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV) ―aims only to enhance diagnostic consistency. It does not speak to 
the nature of mental disorders or distinguish them by anything more essential than their 
clinical appearance. Not a gesture does it make toward the etiopathic principles of cause 
and mechanism that organize medical classifications. …‖1 
McHugh’s diagnosis of the core limitation of the DSM-IV (first published by the 
American Psychiatric Association in 1994) is absolutely correct. No sensible person 
could disagree. The challenge, however, is not so much the diagnosis as the cure. Many 
of the scientific advances that will be needed to understand the neurobiological 
underpinnings of mental disorders remain in the future. The DSM-IV is so deeply 
ingrained in the practice of psychiatry, psychology, and general medicine that it codifies 
mental disorders not only for patients, families, and clinicians, but also for insurance 
companies, regulatory agencies (such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration), the 
justice system, school systems, and others. Any substantial change to the DSM system 
must be carefully managed to avoid many serious disruptions. 
Since the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III), released by the American Psychiatric Association in 1980, the 
diagnosis of mental disorders has been based entirely on clinical descriptions: lists of 
symptoms, their duration, timing of onset, and the like. Motivated as much by the desire 
to elide the deep theoretical divisions (e.g., between psychoanalysts and 
psychopharmacologists) that had existed among clinicians for much of the 20th century 
as by the recognition that the underlying science was fragmentary at best, the DSM-III, 
DSM-IIIR (―R‖ for ―revised‖), and DSM-IV have eschewed explicit references to 
possible causes of illness or to pathologic processes, whether at the psychological or 
neurobiological levels.  
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Although there has been enormous progress in neurobiology during the past 
decade, the problem for those hard at work on the DSM-5 remains the stubborn 
difficulties of the science. The attempt to understand the workings of the human brain 
and to learn exactly what goes wrong to produce mental illnesses must number among the 
most challenging problems scientists have ever faced. Although, for example, the DSM-
5’s writing is well under way, even today its authors do not have the benefit of objective 
medical tests for any common mental disorder. Despite the steep challenges facing 
modern neurobiology, psychology, and genetics in their attempts to decode the mysteries 
of the brain and its ills, I argue that much can be done in constructing the DSM-5 (and 
also the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases, 11th 
edition, or ICD-11) that could facilitate the transition from the shallows of descriptive 
psychiatry to diagnoses based on cause and mechanism. 
 
The Benefits of Shared Diagnostic Criteria 
Despite the limitations we see so clearly in hindsight, the publication of the DSM-
III in 1980 represented a major advance. Earlier editions of the DSM had provided lists of 
mental disorders but no guidance as to how a clinician was to make these putative 
diagnoses. Even where objective diagnostic tests exist in general medicine, as for 
hypertension or iron-deficiency anemia, explicit guidance is needed, such as for 
translating a specific set of blood-pressure readings into a diagnosis and treatment 
recommendations. Lacking objective tests, clinicians varied widely in their diagnosis of 
mental disorders before the DSM-III, and diagnoses also differed among countries where 
different diagnostic practices predominated. For example, it appeared in the 1950s that 
schizophrenia might be twice as common in the U.S. as in Great Britain, but the true 
difference was that in Great Britain, schizophrenia was understood only as a chronic 
condition; in the U.S., ―acute schizophrenia‖ also was diagnosed. As new drug treatments 
began to emerge in the second half of the 20th century, however, it became critical to be 
able to match patients with the most appropriate treatment—to separate schizophrenia 
from bipolar disorder, for example, because the latter responds to lithium, whereas 
schizophrenia typically does not.  
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A pressing need thus emerged to address the lack of inter-rater reliability (often 
shortened to ―reliability‖). Inter-rater reliability means that two different trained raters, 
whether clinicians or researchers, using the diagnostic system are highly likely to reach 
the same diagnosis for a given patient. The solution that scientists embraced in the DSM-
III was to develop and promulgate diagnostic criteria (rules) that were explicit and 
straightforward to apply based on observations of patients or questions that patients or 
family members should readily be able to answer. Thus, for example, the DSM-III 
defined schizophrenia as a chronic disease by explicitly basing the diagnosis on a 
requisite six months of active illness. As a result, the prevalence of schizophrenia was 
recognized to be equivalent on both sides of the Atlantic. Similarly, beginning with the 
DSM-III, major depression was diagnosed only if at least five out of a list of nine 
symptoms were present for at least two weeks.  
 
The Downside to Standardizing Diagnoses Early in Scientific History 
The DSM-III did yield significant progress toward inter-rater reliability, although 
the lack of objective tests keeps reliability far from perfect. Under the surface, however, 
lurked a different problem: validity. Lacking the necessary scientific information, DSM-
III diagnoses were, perforce, the products of expert consensus, not the result of deep 
scientific understanding. In fairness, neither the DSM-III nor any of its successor manuals 
claimed that the diagnoses contained therein represented replicable abnormalities of 
anatomy, physiology, or biochemistry within the brain or provided information about the 
causes of the patient’s symptoms. The most careful thinkers have always understood that 
DSM-III diagnoses should be understood as useful placeholders pending advances in 
research. However, this ―validity problem‖ is often pushed into the background as a 
pragmatic matter. Paradoxically, the very success of the DSM system in improving 
diagnostic agreement among clinicians and across countries required widespread 
acceptance, a development that might not have occurred if users saw the DSM-III as 
merely heuristic.  
As I have argued elsewhere, however, worldwide acceptance of a scientifically 
immature system has come at a price.
2
 Clearly, it is important that a schizophrenia 
treatment study performed at one center is applicable to patients diagnosed with 
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schizophrenia at another. However, the entrenchment of the DSM system has had the 
unintended consequence of suppressing important avenues of scientific investigation. 
What has happened? Clinicians rely on DSM-IV diagnoses to get reimbursed by 
insurance companies. Scientists must generally use DSM-IV criteria to obtain research 
grants or to have papers accepted by journals. The pharmaceutical industry must use 
DSM-IV criteria in selecting patients for clinical trials in order to obtain regulatory 
approval for a new treatment. Psychiatrists and psychologists must memorize DSM-IV 
criteria for licensure exams. As a result, the DSM-IV is often treated more like the 
periodic table of elements than as a highly useful but limited product of expert 
committees working in the United States in the late 1970s—before the advent of modern 
molecular genetics, almost two decades before the first functional magnetic resonance 
imaging study, and only a few years after neurobiology began to coalesce as an academic 
field.  
 
Limitations of the DSM-IV 
As a result of its widespread acceptance, and the de facto reification of its 
diagnostic silos, the DSM-IV exerts far too much influence on the questions that 
scientists can ask and, in practice, do ask.
2
 For example, most neuroimaging studies, 
clinical trials, and other investigations published in mainstream journals have, almost by 
necessity, taken as their starting point individual DSM-IV diagnoses, such as panic 
disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, or anorexia nervosa. Too rarely, however, have 
scientists asked (or been encouraged by funders or journal editors to ask) questions about 
anxiety symptoms, eating-related symptoms, or other constellations of symptoms that 
transgress DSM constructs. Of course the replicability of research on mental disorders 
benefits from a shared diagnostic language. The problem with the DSM-IV, our current 
shared diagnostic language, is that a large and growing body of evidence demonstrates 
that it does a poor job of capturing either clinical and biological realities. In the clinic, the 
limitations of the current DSM-IV approach can be illustrated in three salient areas: (1) 
the problem of comorbidity, (2) the widespread need for ―not otherwise specific (NOS)‖ 
diagnoses, and (3) the arbitrariness of diagnostic thresholds.  
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Multiple Diagnoses, Shared Genetic Risks 
Both in clinical practice and in large epidemiological studies, it is highly likely 
that any patient who receives a single DSM-IV diagnosis will, in addition, qualify for 
others, and the patient’s diagnostic mixture may shift over time. There is a high 
frequency of comorbidity—for example, many patients are diagnosed with multiple 
DSM-IV anxiety disorders and with DSM-IV dysthymia (chronic mild depression), major 
depression, or both. Many patients with an autism–related diagnosis are also diagnosed 
with, obsessive-compulsive disorder and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. The 
frequency with which patients receive multiple diagnoses far outstrips what would be 
predicted if co-occurrence were happening simply by chance. Researchers who have 
made careful studies of comorbidity, such as Robert Krueger at the University of 
Minnesota, have found that co-occurring diagnoses tend to form stable clusters across 
patient populations, suggesting to some that the DSM system has drawn many unnatural 
boundaries within broader psychopathological states.
3
 Kenneth Kendler of Virginia 
Commonwealth University, who has performed twin studies designed to discover genetic 
influences on disease risk, has found that the DSM-IV disorders that frequently co-occur 
with each other may do so as a result of shared genetic risk factors.
4
 In addition, 
emerging technologies in genomics and molecular genetics have begun to identify shared 
―disease risk genes‖—better described as variations in DNA sequences that correlate with 
illness—across multiple DSM diagnoses. For example, DSM-IV schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder appear to share a large number, although not all, of their genetic risk 
factors. One significant divergence is that the genomes of many people with 
schizophrenia, but not bipolar disorder, may harbor disease-associated duplications and 
deletions of large DNA segments. 
Shared genetic risk factors do not refute the existence of patients with ―classical‖ 
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder who would have differing treatment responses and 
different outcomes. What the genetic findings do suggest, however, is that the DSM-IV 
handling of each disorder as a discrete natural category, discontinuous from other 
categories of disorder and from health, is palpably wrong. The sharing of genetic risk 
factors is reflected in clinical populations; more patients have mixed symptoms of 
schizophrenia and of mood disorders than have pure DSM-IV disorders. Some of these 
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intermediate patients meet DSM-IV criteria for ―schizoaffective disorder,‖ a rather 
strange chimeric diagnostic construct, but many do not; many such patients exhibit 
changing symptom patterns during their lifetimes. For these and other disorders, it 
appears that a purely categorical approach to mental disorders fails to capture the realities 
of either clinical practice or laboratory science. Much psychopathology would be better 
represented in terms of quantifiable dimensions analogous to those in hypertension (in 
which the dimensions are systolic and diastolic blood pressure) or diabetes mellitus (in 
which quantitative measures include serum glucose and hemoglobin A1c). In a system 
with underlying dimensions, schizophrenia might be diagnosed in patients with elevated 
scores on symptoms scales that measure psychosis, cognitive disorganization, and deficit 
symptoms. Those patients with mixed symptoms would also have abnormalities on scales 
of negative or positive mood states. These patients would no longer be diagnostic orphans 
(who fall outside DSM-IV’s narrow categories); they would be more amenable to study, 
and ideally they would benefit from the development of new treatments.  
 
“Not Otherwise Specified” and Arbitrary Diagnostic Thresholds 
The overriding focus on reliability led the authors of the DSM-III to produce 
highly specific criteria. Unfortunately, in many domains of psychopathology, these 
criteria pick out small islands in a sea of patients who do not quite fulfill the diagnostic 
criteria—such as many patients with symptoms of both psychosis and mood disorder. 
These patients may receive a diagnosis of ―psychosis NOS,‖ or psychosis not otherwise 
specified. In some areas of practice, such as eating disorders and autism spectrum 
disorders, a majority of patients may receive NOS diagnoses. This observation, like the 
problem of comorbidity, points to categories being far too narrowly drawn, unable to 
capture the full range of symptoms and severities in diagnostic spectra (as in autism) or 
of complex or shifting symptom patterns (as is typical of eating disorders).  
Finally, the categorical system means that a disorder is either absent or present. 
One needs five of nine symptoms for two weeks to qualify for major depression, but 
someone with only four of the symptoms, of high severity, may be more impaired than 
someone else with five, six, or seven. Despite much research, scientists have failed to 
identify any natural ―cut point‖ for the diagnosis of depression—any specific point of 
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discontinuity with ordinary sadness. This suggests that it, too, might be better seen in 
dimensional terms, with treatment recommendations based on levels of impairment or 
distress just as treatment recommendations for hypertension are based on long-term 
outcomes, such as avoiding heart attack and stroke. 
 
Rethinking Diagnostic Classification 
The question facing the DSM-5 Task Force is how it can encourage new 
approaches for science—at present we are not in a position to successfully portray 
disorders in dimensional terms, for example. At the same time, the task force must 
respect the influence of the DSM-IV and not create a premature revolution that might 
return us to a pre-DSM-III state that lacks a shared diagnostic language. How can we give 
the research community not only permission but also encouragement to rethink the 
classification of psychopathology? How can we encourage scientific innovation while 
ensuring that clinicians can still communicate with patients and families—and also with 
insurance companies, schools, and courts?  
The approach for which I have argued is to focus the major efforts of the DSM 
revision not on individual diagnoses but on the assembly of larger clusters that could 
facilitate the application of modern neuroscience, psychology, and genetics to the 
understanding of mental disorders.
2, 5
 Lest that seem far too abstract: Simple phobia, 
social phobia, panic disorders, and generalized anxiety disorder would continue to be 
found in the DSM-5. However, they would be placed in an anxiety disorders cluster. This 
cluster would, moreover, be situated within a larger meta-cluster termed the ―emotional‖ 
or ―internalizing‖ cluster. This meta-cluster would comprise several additional clusters: 
depressive mood disorders (perhaps to include major depression, dysthymia, and a 
proposed mixed anxiety-depression diagnosis); disorders resulting from trauma or severe 
experiences of adversity; and a newly recognized cluster of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder and related disorders (such a compulsive hair pulling or skin picking).  
Scientists would be free to continue to work on individual disorders, but they 
would be encouraged to be agnostic about the narrow boundaries within clusters or even 
some of the divisions within the meta-cluster when designing new genetic, cognitive, 
imaging, or treatment-development studies. We also would hope that new ways of 
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representing symptoms within and across clusters would be tested, such as the 
identification of symptom dimensions, neurobiological endophenotypes (neural 
abnormalities that might underlie symptom productions), and the like. Some candidate 
clusters, such as the emotional or internalizing clusters described above, have come 
directly from the work on comorbidity
3
 and twin studies,
4
 which find that certain 
disorders are highly likely to co-occur. Another proposed cluster might derive from our 
emerging understanding of brain development. Within the DSM-5, these clusters might 
be represented as chapters or other major divisions. What is important, however, is not a 
new table of contents for the DSM-5 but a system that facilitates a fundamental and 
thorough reanalysis of diagnostic classification. 
An important goal, without which such an effort will have little utility, is to 
persuade scientists, funding agencies, and journal editors to treat clusters and meta-
clusters, instead of individual DSM categories alone, as valid bases for research. I would 
imagine that if such an effort were successful, the DSM-6 (more than a decade from now) 
will have far fewer individual diagnoses than the DSM-5 and will represent many 
disorders as intersections among symptom dimensions. It is also possible—indeed, much 
to be wished for—that DSM-6 diagnoses will be constrained by objective tests, such as 
neuroimaging and genetics.  
With respect to the DSM-5, I am agnostic about the diagnostic criteria for 
individual conditions, such as panic disorder or generalized anxiety disorder; in the end, I 
am not certain that either of these categories capture nature or will even appear in the 
DSM-6. When it comes to individual diagnostic categories, I would recommend that the 
DSM-5 take a conservative approach, leaving criteria unchanged unless compelling new 
evidence suggests that a change would be beneficial. Whatever the ultimate approach to 
the DSM-5, it is critical that the scientific community escape the artificial diagnostic silos 
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